F780011-0563

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MELASSIEICATION DITE 9/16/76

THE SECRETARY

DOD+ NSC Concur

I understand that the attached memorandum reflects a recommendation to to the President at a meeting in which Messrs. Ball, Johnson and Rostow participated today.

William H. Brubeck

	DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR REVIEWED by DATE 5/9/80 () RELEASE () DECLASSIFY () EMCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART () DENY () Mon-responsive info. FOI, EO or PA exemptions
TOP SECRET Attachment	TS authority to: () CLASSIFY as, OADR () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

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MEMORINDUM TO THE PREDIDENT

Representatives of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and Mr. Lovett, met to consider the course of action to be followed with respect to the Soviet vessels which have altered course (Group A), and those wassels still proceeding towards Cuba (Group B). With respect to Group A, it is recommended:

1. That the Department of Desense intercept, trail, and motograph, but not interfere with, such vessels. The object is to nord the fact of their turnaround and, to the extent possible, the maracter of their cargo.

With respect to Group B, it is recommended that:

- 1. They be stopped and searched in accordance with the Proclamation;
- 2. That the order to search be determined by the oxpanial availability to our forces;
- 3. Should a vessel refuse to comply with orders to stop, should proceed to execute the terms of the Proclamation with a scial attention to the minimum use of force, given the likelihood into their cargoes will prove innocent.

It is recommended that a Department of Defense spokesman announce that:

- 1. Some of the Bloc vessels proceeding towards Cuba appear to have altered course;
 - 2. No intercepts have yet been necessary;
- 3. Other vessels are proceeding towards Cuba and will be intercepted in accordance with the Proclamation.

On a background basis, it will be explained that those vessels which altered course were those we had reason to believe contained offensive weapons; but that inspection of other vessels is required, now and in

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the future, until offensive weapons and installations are removed from Cuba, because such vessels could contain essential components for offensive weapons.

W. W. R.

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SPECIAL HANDLING

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FROM:
UMBER:
DATE:

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature
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10/24/62	K Guthrie	19
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The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

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ANNOTATED COPY FOLLOWS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 24, 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

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With respect to Group B, it is recommended that:

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- 2. That the order of search be determined by the order of their operational availability to our forces;
- 3. Should a vessel refuse to comply with orders to stop, we should proceed to execute the terms of the Proclamation with special attention to the minimum use of force, given the likelihood that their cargoes will prove innocent.

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W. W. R.